Ukraine: Between Scylla and Charybdis by and Commercial Regulation, North Carolina Journal of International Law
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 40 | Number 1 Article 6
Fall 2014
Ukraine: Between Scylla and Charybdis
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
North Carolina Journal o. and Commercial Regulation, Ukraine: Between Scylla and Charybdis, 40 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 219
(2014).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol40/iss1/6
Ukraine: Between Scylla and Charybdis
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This note is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/
ncilj/vol40/iss1/6
Ukraine: Between Scylla and Charybdis
Max Biedermannt
I. The Options: the European Union and the Eurasian
Customs Union ................................. 221
A. The European Union... ..............................222
1. Economics of the European Union ... ........... 223
2. Joining the European Union........... ..... 224
a. The Political Criterion........................225
b. The Economic Criterion .....................226
c. The Acquis Criterion.........................226
B. The Eurasian Customs Union ................ 227
1. The Economics of the Customs Union .... ..... 228
2. Joining the Eurasian Customs Union..... ..... 228
II. The Situation in Ukraine........................229
A. Ukraine's Position between the EU and Russia's
CU................. .................. 231
1. Recent Developments Involving the EU.................232
2. Recent Developments involving Russia and the
CU .............................................. 233
III. Ukraine's Decision and its Implications ................... 235
A. Implications for Ukraine ............... ..... 235
1. Integrating with EU.....................235
2. Integrating with the CU ................... 237
B. Why is Ukraine Important to Russia and the CU?........238
C. Next Steps for Russia and the CU........... ........... 240
IV. Conclusion .................................... 243
Ulysses and his crew "entered the Straits in great fear of mind,
for on the one hand was Scylla, and on the other dread Charybdis
kept sucking up the salt water."' The night before continuing his
journey home, the Greek goddess Circe had warned Ulysses about
the paths that laid before him-either guide his ship close to the
t J.D. Candidate 2015, University of North Carolina School of Law; Note and Comment
Editor of North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation. The
author would like to thank his family for their support throughout the writing of this note.
I HoMER, THE ODYSSEY 100 (Jose D. Perezgonzalez ed., Samuel Butler trans.,
2006).
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monster Scylla, which promised death to some of his crew; or
travel by the whirlpool Charybdis, which if he traveled by at the
wrong time would kill his entire crew.2 Although Ulysses chose to
suffer losses at the hand of Scylla, he was able to guide his ship
past these two titanic forces.' The states caught between joining
either the European Union or Russia's Eurasian Customs Union
are faced with the same dilemma, because they have learned, just
as Ulysses did, that there is no way "of escaping Charybdis, and at
the same time keeping Scylla off."4
"The rapid proliferation of regional economic integration
models in the latter half of the 2 0 th century is often attributed to the
success of the European Economic Community ("EEC")
established in 1957."s The success the EEC achieved in increasing
trade among its members in the 1960s "inspired countries on other
continents to set up regional organizations: ASEAN in South East
Asia (1967), ECOWAS in West Africa (1975), MERCOSUR in
Latin America (1991) and NAFTA in North America (1994), to
name but a few." 6 In a way, the European Union ("EU") was built
on top of the foundation laid by the EEC.'
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the
aftermath that followed, the "newly independent States in the post-
Soviet area have been involved in various integration processes."8
2 See id.
3 See id.
4 Id. at 98.
5 Steven Blockmans, Hrant Kostanyan & levgen Vorobiov, Towards a Eurasian
Economic Union: The Challenge of Integration and Unity, CEPS SPECIAL REPORT, no.
75, Dec, 2012, at 1.
6 Id. ("Integration within these groupings has been limited to free trade
agreements, however, with the notable exception of MERCOSUR establishing its
customs union in 1995.")
7 See ANDREAS G. KOURVETARIS & GEORGE A. KOURVETARIS, THE IMPACT OF
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, AND ECONOMIC CHANGES 151, 151
(George A. Kourvetaris & Andreas Moschonas ed., 1996).
8 Sherzod Shadikhodjaev, Trade Integration in the CIS Region: A Thorny Path
Towards A Customs Union, 12(3) JIEL 555 (2009). "In the political field, the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) comprising 12 ex-Soviet republics and
excluding Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; the Belarus-Russia Union; the organization of
'GUAM' (which stands for Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova); and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (which also includes China in addition to five CIS
countries) have emerged. In the military field, the Collective Security Treaty
Organization was established. Finally, the economic sphere includes Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs), the Single Economic Space (SES) between Belarus, Kazakhstan,
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The first integration processes occurred in December 1991 through
the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States
("CIS"), which includes Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.9 However, "[o]nce the
idea of the creation of a customs union within the entire CIS
region failed the feasibility test, smaller groups of like-minded CIS
countries have embarked on new initiatives . . . .'"o This article
will focus on two of the main initiatives-joining either the
European Union or the Russian backed Eurasian Customs Union.
While exploring the implications of joining either the European
Union or the Eurasian Customs Union, this note will take into
account the current situation in Ukraine."
This note will argue that with Russia's reemergence into the
international sphere, the Eurasian Customs Union needs to entice
Ukraine and others to join to succeed in the long term. This note
is organized in three parts: Part I of this note will discuss the
European Union and Eurasian Customs Union; Part II will discuss
the current situation and developments in Ukraine; and Part III will
explore the implications that joining either one will have for
Ukraine and the Eurasian Customs Union.
I. The Options: the European Union and the Eurasian
Customs Union
Regionalism-"the tendency for states to form regional
groupings"-involves states situated in geographic proximity to
each other banding together to form economic and political
blocks. 2 After the Soviet Union collapsed, many of the former
Soviet Republics located in the East-Central region of Europe
proceeded to join the European Union and NATO.'" The
Ukraine and Russia, and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC 2).' Id.
9 See About Commonwealth of Independent States, INTERSTATE STATISTICAL
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES, http://www.cisstat
.com/eng/cis.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
10 Shadikhodjaev, supra note 8, at 556.
11 For information on the current situation in Ukraine see infra Part II.
12 RILKA DRAGNEVA & KATARYNA WOLCZUK, The Eurasian Customs Union:
Framing the Analysis, EURASIAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 1 (2013).
13 See id. In 2004, the European Union accepted 10 new member states. Poland
and Estonia are examples of Soviet Republics and satellite states that have since joined
the EU. See European Commission - Enlargement - 3 Years After, EUROPEAN
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remaining states1 4 were left with a simple choice-join the West or
pursue re-integration with the East.
A. The European Union
If the remaining states were to join the West, they would be
joining the European Union in some capacity. The EU is an
economic and political partnership between twenty-eight European
states." A primary goal of the EU is to create a single market
based on the free movement of goods, services, people, and
money.'" The Treaty on European Union, signed on February 7,
1992, in Maastricht, Netherlands, was fundamental in establishing
the foundation of the European Union. For example, it established
the creation of an economic and monetary union among member
states; the steps to the creation of a common European currency,
the Euro; union citizenship and the right of free movement among
member states; and foreign and security policy. 7  Subsequent
treaties led to the further integration of Europe.
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/5thenlargement/index-en.htm (last
visited Mar. 12, 2014).
14 The states that did not join the EU are Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan,
Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. See Mark Rice-Oxley, Ami Sedghi,
Jenny Ridley & Sasha Magill, End of the USSR: Visualising How the Former Soviet
Countries Are Doing, 20 Years On, DATA BLOG, THE GUARDIAN,
http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/20 11/aug/17/ussr-soviet-countries-data
(Aug. 17, 2011, 09:27 EDT); see also Countries, EUROPEAN UNION,
http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index en.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
15 See How the EU Works, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-
eu/index en.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2014). In order to create the EU, the first step was
to foster economic cooperation in Europe, which was achieved through the creation of
the EEC in 1958. Over time the EEC's focus expanded beyond just fostering economic
cooperation and began to enter into other policy areas, which eventually lead to the EEC
evolving into the EU in 1993. See id.
16 See Europe Without Frontiers, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-
history/1990-1999/indexen.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
17 See Terry R. Broderick, The Maastricht Summit: Further Progress Toward
European Union, 20 INT'L Bus. LAw. 349, 349-51 (1992).
18 The foundation laid by the Treaty on the European Union has since been
modified and expanded through subsequent agreements and treaties including the Treaty
of Amsterdam, the Treaty of Nice, and most recently, the Treaty of Lisbon. For more
detail on the treaties and the gradual process of European integration, see Stefaan Van
den Bogaert, The Treaty of Lisbon: The European Union's Own Judgment of Solomon?,
15 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 7, 8-10, 17-18 (2008).
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1. Economics of the European Union
One of the key benefits of choosing to integrate into the EU is
the fact that the EU's economy is the second largest in the world in
terms of GDP.19 Although the EU makes up about 7% of the
world's population, "the EU's trade with the rest of the world
accounts for around 20% of global exports and imports." 20
However, despite its strength, the EU is not without problems, as it
is still navigating the aftermath of a sovereign debt crisis that
wreaked havoc on many member states and resulted in bailouts for
some members of the Euro-zone2 '-Greece, Portugal, Spain,
Ireland, and Cyprus.2 2
The Euro-zone's recovery has been slow as output increased
by only 0.3% during the last quarter of 2013.23 "The strengthening
in the recovery was bolstered by the currency club's two
heavyweights, Germany and France, which together make up
about half of Euro-zone GDP."24 However, the results have been
mixed for the eighteen states that have adopted the Euro, as some
of the peripheral states' output grew in the last quarter of 2013,
while others saw output fall.2 ' This crisis has led to the call for
further integration of the Euro-zone economies by strengthening
the European Central Bank and entering into treaties that aim to
boost budgetary discipline and coordination.26
19 See European Union, The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.htm (last visited
Feb. 15, 2014) (estimating that the GDP for 2012 was $15.54 trillion).
20 The Economy, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/facts-figures/
economy/index en.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
21 The Eurozone is made up of EU member states that have adopted the Euro. See
Eurozone, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition
/americanenglish/eurozone.
22 See Heather Stewart, Eurozone Bailouts: Which Countries Remain?, THE
GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/dec/13
/eurozone-bailouts-greece-portugal-cyprus-spain ("Ireland .. .bec[ame] the first
Eurozone country to exit a bailout.").
23 With Seasonally Adjusted Love, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 14, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2014/02/euro-zone-recovery.
24 Id. ("They grew by 0.4% and 0.3% respectively, in both cases a bit stronger than
expected.").
25 See id. (stating that Cyprus, for example, had output fall by 1%, while Portugal's
output increased by 0.5%).
26 See European Union, supra note 19 (stating that 26 of 28 EU member states (all
except the UK and Czech Republic) intend to enter into a "fiscal compact"). The
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2. Joining the European Union
The EU has gradually enlarged from six to twenty-eight
members, the last being Croatia, which joined the EU on January
7, 2013.27 The bedrock of the EU's expansion policy is The Treaty
on the European Union, which states "that any European country
may apply for membership if it respects the democratic values of
the EU and is committed to promoting them."28 Once a state
applies to join the EU, its application must be approved by all
current member states.29 If the applicant state is approved it begins
an accession process, which was espoused in 1993 by the
Copenhagen European Council. 30
The Copenhagen European Council was responsible for
establishing the key criteria for accession to the EU, known as the
Copenhagen criteria.3 ' The Copenhagen criteria establish three
main criteria that must be met: a political criterion, an economic
criterion, and an acquis criterion.3 2 In addition, the EU must meet
its own criterion-it must ensure that it has the ability to integrate
new members.3 ' The criteria are "not just a wish-list or a
expansion of the power of the European Central Bank has met resistance, most notably
from Germany. See It isn't over, THE ECONOMIST, (Feb. 15, 2014), available at
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21596570-european-monetary-
policy-has-not-been-given-reprieve-markets-believe-it-isnt?zid=295&ah=
Obca374e65f2354d553956ea65f756e0. On February 7, 2014, a German court found that
the European Central Bank had overstepped its mandate and that Outright Monetary
Transactions "was a backdoor to 'monetary financing' of governments, outlawed under
European treaties." Id.
27 See From 6 to 28 Members, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu
/enlargement/policy/from-6-to-28-members/indexen.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
28 See Conditions for Membership, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.
eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/indexen.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
29 See Scottish Independence: Barroso Says Joining EU Would be 'Difficult', BBC
NEWS (Feb. 16, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-
26215963 (stating that an independent Scotland could face challenges gaining approval
from all current member states because some states may worry about implications that
approval could have regarding separatist regions in their own states).
30 See Tanja Marktler, The Power of the Copenhagen Criteria, 2 CYELP 343, 344
(2006).
31 See Conditions for Membership, supra note 28.
32 See Marktler, supra note 30, at 344-45.
33 See Conditions for Membership, supra note 28; see also Marktler, supra note 30,
at 344 ("[T]he Copenhagen European Council stated that the Union's capacity to absorb
new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an
important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate
UKRAINE: BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS
statement of expectations, but a workable tool in governing the
accession"; as a result, an applicant's progress toward meeting the
criteria is closely monitored.3 4 To incentivize an applicant to meet
the Copenhagen criteria, the European Council enacted Council
Regulation 622/98, which conditions financial aid on an
applicant's fulfillment of the criteria.3s For states looking to join
the EU, the Copenhagen criteria are especially important because
meeting the criteria may be difficult and will undoubtedly result in
changes to their governments and economies. 6 Some of the main
elements of each criterion will be briefly explored below.
a. The Political Criterion
In order to meet the political criterion, an applicant must have
"stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law,
"937human rights and respect for and protection of minorities ....
Furthermore, an applicant state must conduct free and fair
democratic elections that abide by international standards. 38  "A
national parliament satisfying the political criteria 'continues to
operate satisfactorily, its powers are respected and the opposition
plays full part in its activities. "'3' The political criterion also
requires transparency regarding all stages of the legislative
process.40  Another important condition is that the executive
should be "completely demilitarised . .. including the police,
which should be composed of civilian public servants, serving the
rule of law." 41 Next, the "judiciary should be independent, well-
countries." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
34 Marktler, supra note 30, at 347 ("The annually published progress reports, for
instance, indicate whether each of the applicant countries has satisfied the various
criteria.") (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). "The candidates'
accession maturity is evaluated, and the results are subjected to extensive analysis, which
itself becomes the basis for numerous recommendations." Id.
35 See id.
36 See id. at 348.
37 Conditions for Membership, supra note 28.
38 See Marktler, supra note 30, at 349-50 (citing EUROPEAN COMM'N, 2002
REGULAR REPORT ON LATVIA'S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION 19 (2002), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdflkey_documents/2002/lv-en.pdo.
39 Id. at 350 (citing EUROPEAN COMM'N, REGULAR REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION
ON BULGARIA'S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION 8 (1998), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdflkeydocuments/I 998/bulgaria en.pdf).
40 Id. at 350.
41 Id. at 351 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing EUROPEAN COMM'N, 2002
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staffed, well-trained, well-paid, efficient, respected and accessible
to citizens. Finally, the EU looks to how well the applicant is
fighting corruption.43
b. The Economic Criterion
In order to fulfill the economic criterion, an applicant must
have "a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with
competition and market forces in the EU . . ."44 To have a
functioning market economy, the applicant must ensure that prices
and trade are liberalized; an enforceable legal system, including
property rights, is in place; there is sufficient privatization; and
there are no significant barriers to entry and exit.4 5 In regards to
possessing the capacity to cope with competition and market
forces, the EU often looks at the applicant's infrastructure, state
and private enterprise investment and efficiency, and the amount
of human and physical capital.46
c. The Acquis Criterion
The acquis criterion is met if, and when, the applicant has "the
ability to take on and implement effectively the obligations of
membership, including adherence to the aims of political,
economic, and monetary union."47 The acquis criterion was
expanded in 1995 by the Madrid European Council to ensure that
EU law "is not only ... adopted, but also applied and enforced"
through the "[e]xpansion of administrative structures for effective
adoption of the acquis." 48 In total, there are thirty-five separate
chapters that make up acquis.49 Some of the topics covered by the
REGULAR REPORT ON ROMANIA'S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION 24 (2002), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/keydocuments/2002/ro en.pdf).
42 Id. at 351.
43 See id.
44 Conditions for Membership, supra note 28.
45 See Marktler, supra note 30, at 353.
46 See id. at 354 (citing EUROPEAN COMM'N, 2001 REGULAR REPORT ON
BULGARIA'S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION 33 (2001), available at http://ec.europa.
eu/enlargement/archives/pdflkey_documents/200 I/buen.pdf).
47 Conditions for Membership, supra note 28.
48 See Marktler, supra note 30, at 345.
49 European Comm'n, Chapters of the Acquis, ENLARGEMENT, http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/chapters-of-the-acquis/index-en.htm (last
visited Sept. 1, 2014).
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acquis are free movement of goods, intellectual property law,
energy, taxation, and judiciary and fundamental rights.so
B. The Eurasian Customs Union
As demonstrated by the formation of the EU, the first step in
forming a strong union is to integrate the economies of the
individual states." Therefore, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
have sought to. integrate their economies through the creation of
the Customs Union ("CU") "[i]n the lead-up to the creation of a
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), foreseen for 2015... ."5 The
CU was perceived as the second stage toward the creation of a
fully integrated economic union when The Treaty on the
Establishment of the Customs Union ("CU Treaty") was signed in
2007." The CU "encompasses a common customs territory and
legislation ... a single commodity nomenclature of foreign
economic activity, common customs tariff and non-tariff
regulation measures, as well as common procedures for customs
clearance and control." 54
The future development of the CU will be interesting, as the
three members have at times stated different goals for the union.5
For instance, Belarusian leader Aleksandr Lukashenko has called
for wider diplomatic and political integration between the states,
while Kazakh leader Narsultan Nazarbaev has stated that the CU
"must not become politicized." 6  Nevertheless, Russian leader
Vladimir Putin has stated that the EEU, an economic and political
union, is "still on course to come into power on the long-declared
date of January 1, 2015.. ..
50 See id.
51 See supra Part L.A..
52 Blockmans, Kostanyan & Vorobiov, supra note 5, at i.
53 See generally EURASIAN ECON. COMM'N, EURASIAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
FACTS AND FIGURES 14-15 (2013) (stating that in the first stage, the FTA in the Eurasian
space was created under the umbrella of the Commonwealth of Independent States).
54 Blockmans, Kostanyan & Vorobiov, supra note 5, at 1-2.
5s See Armenia Signs Customs Union Roadmap, Kyrgyzstan Needs More Talks, RT
(Dec. 25, 2013, 8:32 AM), http://rt.com/business/kyrgyzstan-armenia-customs-union-
749/.
56 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
57 Id.
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1. The Economics of the Customs Union
The states that make up the CU encompass an estimated 170
million people and around fifteen percent of the world's surface."
The core of the CU is Russia, whose economy is around six and a
half times larger than both Belarus and Kazakhstan's economies
combined." In 2010, when the CU officially became operational,
"the mutual trade in the CU was mainly aggregated by Russia,
which had rather intense trade links with the two other members of
the economic union, whereas Belarus and Kazakhstan had very
limited trade flows in goods between them.""o Russia's superior
trade interest and position is reflected by its increased voting rights
in the Commission of the Customs Union created by the CU
Treaty."
The Commission of the Customs Union has the authority to
regulate foreign trade, which includes the authority to "change
import duty rates; introduce the commodity nomenclature of the
Customs Union; establish tariff preferences and tariff quotas;
define the system of tariff preferences; [and] introduce non-tariff
regulatory measures."62 According to the Commission, during the
January through December 2012 period, reciprocal trade between
CU member states was $68.6 billion, an increase of 108.7% during
the same period in the previous year.
2. Joining the Eurasian Customs Union
The CU is open to expanding membership to other states "that
58 See EURASIAN ECON. COMM'N, supra note 53, at 10-11.
59 Compare Russia, Economy, The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.htmi (last visited
Feb. 21, 2014) (GDP of $2.486 trillion in 2012), with Belarus, Economy, The World
Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/bo.htmi (last visited Feb. 21, 2014) (GDP of $145.3 billion in
2012), and Cent. Intelligence Agency, Kazakhstan, Economy, THE WORLD FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kz.htm (last visited
Feb. 21, 2014) (GDP of $228.7 billion in 2012).
60 Blockmans, Kostanyan & Vorobiov, supra note 5, at 8.
61 See Blockmans, Kostanyan & Vorobiov, supra note 5, at 2 ("The Treaty on the
Commission of the CU (6 Oct. 2007) established a supranational body composed of one
member from each state at the level of deputy head of government. The votes in the
Commission were distributed as follows: Belarus - 21.5%; Kazakhstan - 21.5%; Russian
Federation - 57%.").
62 EURASIAN ECON. COMM'N, supra note 53, at 14.
63 See id. at 17.
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share goals ... of the union and are prepared to take over the
commitments deriving from that membership."' Currently the
CU is courting Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan; furthermore,
the leaders of the CU have discussed plans to possibly invite
Turkey, India, and even Syria to join.6 5 Russia has been active in
recruiting Ukraine to join the CU.6 6 At this time, Armenia appears
to be on course to be the first new member to successfully enter
the CU.67
In practice, the CU requires potential members to implement a
"road map" on accession that identifies how the state is going to
adopt CU standards. 68 Because the CU at this point in time is an
economic union, the CU requires applicant states to adopt only
economic and trade reforms, including its Unified Customs
Code.69  For example, Armenia's road map requires the state to
implement extensive legislative amendments regarding customs
and taxation, as well as amendments to its criminal and
administrative codes.70
II. The Situation in Ukraine
Like most of the states that were once part of the Soviet Union,
the modem state of Ukraine achieved independence after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.71 "After Russia, the
64 Id. at 35.
65 See Viktor Kuzmin, Customs Union Courting India, Turkey for Membership,
RUSSIAN & INDIAN REPORT (Nov. 6, 2013), http://indrus.in/economics/2013/11/06/
customsunion_courtingindia turkeyfor membership_30623.htmi (reporting that
Russian experts are skeptical about the prospects of India, Turkey, and Syria joining,
specifically stating that "[tjhere is nothing more to it than proposals at this point").
66 See Timothy Heritage, Ukraine Holds Key to Putin's Dream of a New Union,
REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2013, 7:47 AM EST), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/l1/29/us-
ukraine-eu-putin-idUSBRE9ASOF320131129.
67 See Armenia Signs Customs Union Roadmap, supra note 55 (reporting that even
though Armenia expressed interest to join in 2013, it should enter the Customs Union
before Kyrgyzstan, which applied to join in 2011).
68 See, e.g., Emma Gabrielyan, Customs Union "Achievements" Are Already
Outlined, ARAVOT.AM (Feb. 6, 2014, 3:29 PM), http://en.aravot.am/2014/02/06/163689/
(stating that Armenia's Customs Union road map includes 262 actions that must be taken
for CU accession).
69 See supra Part I.A.2 (requiring potential members to enact various political and
humanitarian reforms).
70 See Gabrielyan, supra note 68.
71 See Ukraine:, The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Introduction,
2014 229
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Ukrainian republic was the most important economic component
of the former Soviet Union, producing about four times the output
of the next-ranking republic."72 Since independence, Ukraine has
suffered from various economic crises, which have resulted in
Ukraine being bailed out by the IMF. Additionally, Ukraine's
dependence on Russian energy imports has created tension
between it and Russia.74 As of 2012, Ukraine's GDP was
estimated at $336.1 billion, with growth at a mere 0.2% that year."
Ukraine has around 44.5 million people. Generally speaking,
Ukraine is divided ethnically, politically, and linguistically into
eastern and western halves.n This divide is important because it
often pits ethnic Ukrainians on one side of the country and ethnic
Russians against each other when it comes to deciding the future
of the Ukrainian state and its relationship with Russia and the
EU." Before the civil unrest in Ukraine, the country's last elected
president was Viktor Yanukovych, who won the majority of his
votes in the Russian-speaking eastern half of the country.7 9 The
current president, pro-European billionaire Petro 0. Poroshenko,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html (last visited
Feb. 22, 2014).
72 Id.
73 See id. (summarizing Ukraine's $16.4 billion Stand-By Arrangement in
November 2008 and a new agreement with the IMF for a $15.1 billion Stand-By
Agreement in August 2010). Both IMF programs have stalled due to the Ukrainian
government's lack of progress in satisfying the reform conditions contained in the
agreements. Id.
74 See The Gas Dispute between Russia and Ukraine, RIA NovoSTI,
http://en.ria.ru/infographics/20131126/185027685/Russia--Ukraine-Gas-Dispute.html
(last visited Nov. 26, 2013). Disputes over gas prices charged by Russia have occurred
frequently since 1991. See id. These disputes have escalated to the point where, on
November 9, 2013, Ukraine decided to triple its imports from Europe and completely
halt supplies from Russia. Id.
75 Ukraine, supra note 71, Economy.
76 Id. (reporting the population as of February 22, 2014).
77 See R.L.G., Johnson: Is There a Single Ukraine?, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 5th
2014, 11:31 AM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/prospero/2014/02/linguistic-
divides?fsrc=scn/fb/wl/bl/isthereasingleukraine ("[Generally], [t]he west and north are
predominantly Ukrainian-speaking, [while] the east and south predominantly Russian-
speaking.").
78 See id. (noting the difference in the interests of the two sides being stark enough
for there to be calls for a variety of solutions from federalism to even outright partition of
the country).
79 See id.
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was elected on May 25, 2014.0
A. Ukraine's Position between the EU and Russia's CU.
Ukraine "has long divided its loyalties and economy between
Europe and longtime ruler Moscow, giving it huge strategic
importance to Russia, Europe, and the United States."' Since its
independence in 1991, Ukraine has been reluctant to participate in
post-Soviet integration regimes, and this reluctance can be shown
by Ukraine's preference "for 'pick and mix' formats, . . . observer
status,... or general, declarative frameworks."82 In reality,
Ukraine has attempted to walk two separate paths of regional
economic integration." For instance, Ukraine is a co-founder of
the CIS, which, "among other things, is aimed at achieving close
economic integration among the former republics of the Soviet
Union."8 4  While "[o]n the other hand,... Ukraine has expressed
its ambition to integrate into the [EU] on the basis of association
and even accession."s As a result, "Ukraine's foreign policy
constantly oscillates between closer relations with Brussels . .. and
Moscow. . . ."86
80 See David M. Herszenhorn, Pro-European Businessman Claims Victory in
Ukraine Presidential Vote, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014
/05/26/world/europe/ukraine-elections.html. While President Poroshenko was elected by
a majority of voters in both the eastern and western halves of the country, it is important
to note that this may have occurred because of low voter turnout, especially among the
pro-Russian voters in the eastern half of Ukraine. See Sergiy Kudelia, Ukraine's 2014
Presidential Election Result Is Unlikely to Be Repeated, WASH. POST (June 2, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/06/02/ukraines-2014-
presidential-election-result-is-unlikely-to-be-repeated/.
81 Maria Danilova & Yuras Karmanau, Ukraine: East-West Tensions; Protesters
Take Kiev, YAHOO NEWS (Feb. 22, 2014, 9:05 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/ukraine-east-
west-tensions-protesters-kiev-I12551381 0.html.
82 Rilka Dragneva & Kataryna Wolczuk, It Is Far from Certain that Joining the
Eurasian Customs Union Would Offer Ukraine the Kind of Benefits Being Predicted by
Russia, European Politics and Policy, THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND
POLITICAL SCIENCE (Dec. 12, 2013), http://blogs.Ise.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/12/12/it-is-
far-from-certain-that-joining-the-eurasian-customs-union-would-offer-ukraine-the-kind-
of-benefits-being-predicted-by-russia/.
83 See Guillaume Van der Loo & Peter Van Elsuwege, Competing Paths of
Regional Economic Integration in the Post-Soviet Space: Legal and Political Dilemmas
for Ukraine, 37 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. [R.C.E.E.L.] 421, 421 (2012) (Italy).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 421-22.
86 Id. at 422.
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1. Recent Developments Involving the EU
Although Ukrainian leadership has discussed full-scale
accession to the EU, Ukraine has more recently been linked to
other economic integration strategies with the EU." The EU has
seen Ukraine as "a key partner within the European Neighborhood
Policy (ENP), which was complemented with a so-called 'Eastern
Partnership' in 2009 'to accelerate political association and further
economic integration' between the European Union and its East
European neighbors."" In furtherance of the objectives of the
Eastern Partnership, the EU sought to negotiate an Association
Agreement and enter into a "Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Area" ("DCFTA") with Ukraine.89
The 2013 Vilnius Summit, held from November 28 to 29, "was
meant to be crowned by the signing of an association agreement
and all-encompassing trade deal with Ukraine." 90 However, things
did not go according to the EU's plans.9' Instead of signing the
agreements, "the Ukrainian Government [decided] to suspend
temporarily the process of preparations for signature of the
Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Area between the EU and Ukraine." 9 2 Theories of why Ukraine
backed out of the deal are varied. Regardless of the reason,
87 See id. ("After the 2005 Orange Revolution, then-President Viktor Yushchenko
radically opted for deep integration with the EU in preparation of full membership in the
future.").
88 Id. at 422.
89 See Van der Loo & Van Elsuwege, supra note 83, at 422.
90 Keep the Door Open: How Europe Nearly Lost Ukraine-but May yet Regain It,
THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 8, 2014) [hereinafter Keep the Door Open], http://www.
economist.com/news/europe/21595957-how-europe-nearly-lost-ukrainebut-may-yet-
regain-it-keep-door-open.
91 Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Vilnius, Eastern
Partnership: The Way Ahead, Council of the European Union (Nov. 29, 2013), available
at http://register.consilium.europa.euldoc/srv?l=EN&f-ST%2017130%20201/3%2OINIT
(last visited Aug. 30, 2014).
92 Id.
93 Keep the Door Open, supra note 90 ("The Europeans disagree over what went
wrong. To some, Mr Yanukovych played them as fools, using the EU deal to improve
Russia's offer. To others, the EU was wrong to insist on the release of Yulia
Tymoshenko, a former prime minister jailed by Mr Yanukovych. A third theory holds
that the EU offer lacked a crucial element: the promise of eventual EU membership. A
fourth says the very notion of an 'eastern partnership' was misconceived. It was born out
of the failure in 2008 to put Ukraine and Georgia on the road to NATO membership.").
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Ukraine's decision was a step back in terms of its integration with
the EU.94
It seems, however, that hope for integration with the EU is not
dead.95 For example, in February 2014, around the time of the
ouster of President Yanukovych, "Ukraine's [then] interim
President Oleksandr Turchynov ... said the country will focus on
closer integration with the EU."9 On June 27, 2014, President
Poroshenko signed a trade agreement with the EU that will allow
businesses in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to "trade freely in
any of the EU's 28 member nations without tariffs or restrictions,
as long as their goods and practices meet EU standards." 97 While
this deal does not require the reforms that formal accession would
require," it does call for "adopting EU rules on government
contracts, competition policy and copyright for ideas and
inventions [which] should improve Ukraine's economy by
reducing widespread corruption and making it more investor-
friendly." 99  Given Ukraine's history of oscillating its interest
between Russia in the east and the EU in the west, it will be
interesting to see how long Ukraine's interest stays with the EU.
2. Recent Developments involving Russia and the CU
When President Viktor Yanukovych unexpectedly rejected the
EU agreements, he instead pivoted his foreign policy towards
Russia.'o Shortly after suspending negotiations with the EU,
Russia and Ukraine entered into agreements, which lowered "the
price of gas exports, [removed] trade barriers and [invested] $15
billion in Ukraine's government."1o' Vladimir Putin announced
94 See id.
95 See Ukraine: Interim Leader Turchynov Stresses "European Choice ", BBC
NEWS (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26317912.
96 Id.
97 John-Thor Dahlburg, Ukraine's New President Signed The Historic EU Trade
Agreement That Sparked The Entire Crisis, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 27, 2014),
http://www.businessinsider.com/ukraines-new-president-signed-the-historic-eu-trade-
agreement-that-sparked-the-entire-crisis-2014-6. The deal will also allow EU goods and
services to be sold easily and cheaply in the three countries. Id.
98 See supra Part I.B.2.
99 Dahlburg, supra note 97.
100 Keep the Door Open, supra note 90.
101 Damien McElroy, Ukraine Receives HalfPrice Gas and $15 Billion to Stick with
Russia, THE TELEGRAPH (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news
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that these agreements had nothing to do with Ukraine's accession
to the CU, but many outsiders were skeptical.'02
It would appear that the skeptics were right. Before the deals
with Russia were announced, "the Ukrainian cabinet . .. instructed
the nation's Economic Development Ministry ... to draw up a
roadmap [sic] for Ukraine to join the [CU].""o3 There have been
few major developments regarding the road map because
Ukraine's "decision in late November to suspend talks with the
European Union on a new trade agreement and instead court
stronger trade ties with neighbor Russia sparked widespread
protests that are continuing," at this time.'" As a result of
President Yanukovych's recent dismissal, "Russia, which had
backed him, has recalled its ambassador to Ukraine for
consultations."'0 ' It now appears that Russia will need to
reconsider how to get Ukraine into the CU.' 6
On February 27, 2014, "Russia in effect occupied Crimea, part
of the sovereign territory of Ukraine, under the pretence of
protecting its Russian-speaking population."' 7 Russia's bloodless
takeover of Crimea, a region of Ukraine predominately made up of
ethnic Russians, has drawn comparisons to Nazi Germany's
annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland in 1938 and 1939.108
Russia's logic regarding Crimea would also justify military
intervention in other ethnically Russian areas of eastern Ukraine.
On March 1, 2014, President Putin was granted the right to use
worldnews/europe/ukraine/1 0523225/Ukraine-receives-half-price-gas-and- 15-billion-to-
stick-with-Russia.html.
102 See id. ("This [deal] is not tied to any conditions . . . we have not discussed the
issue of Ukraine's accession to the custom union at all today."). But see Keep the Door
Open, supra note 90 ("Russia ... offered a $15 billion loan and cheaper gas-all in
hopes of luring Ukraine into its own Eurasian customs union.").
103 Ukraine on Brink of Economic Deal With Russia - Premier, RIA NovosTI (Dec.
14, 2013), http://en.ria.ru/world/20131214/185553850.html.
104 Armenian 'Road Map' To Russian-Led Customs Union Ready; Kyrgyzstan
Nearly So, RADIO FREE EUROPE/ RADIO LIBERTY (Dec. 24, 2013), http://www.rferl.org
/content/armenia-russia-seec-customs-union-kyrgyzstan-ukraine-belarus-
kazakhstan/25211298.html.
105 Ukraine: Interim Leader Turchynov Stresses "European Choice ", supra note 95.
106 See id.
107 The End of the Beginning?, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 8, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21598744-having-occupied-crimea-russia-
stirring-up-trouble-eastern-ukraine-end.
108 Id.
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military force in Ukraine by the upper house of Russia's
parliament. 09 Although no large-scale military intervention has
taken place at this point, Ukraine's government has claimed that
there is currently a "threat of a full-scale invasion [by Russia] from
various directions."" 0
III. Ukraine's Decision and its Implications
The ultimate fate of Ukraine would send a clear message to
other states that are currently weighing the merits of joining either
the European Union or Russia and the Eurasian Customs Union.
This part will explore the implications for Ukraine of joining either
union, and what next steps Russia could take to add Ukraine and
other states to the CU.
A. Implications for Ukraine
1. Integrating with EU
Although ultimately accession may be an option for Ukraine,
the most recent offers from the EU have come in the form of an
Association Agreement and a DCFTA."' Both of these
agreements will provide Ukraine increased access to the European
market for Ukrainian goods. The DCFTA is designed to "go
further than classic free trade areas, as it will both open up markets
but also address competitiveness issues and the steps needed to
meet EU standards and trade on EU markets."ll 2  As of 2012,
109 Id.
110 Kathy Lally & William Branigin, Ukraine Accuses Russia of Massing Troops,
THE WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/moscow-up-
pressure-on-ukraine-as-countrys-new-leader-prepares-for-white-house-
visit/2014/03/12/310429f2-a9ca- II e3-8599-ce7295b685 Ic_story.html. ("Andriy
Parubiy, secretary of Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council, told reporters in
Kiev that Russia has deployed more than 80,000 troops, up to 270 tanks and 140 combat
planes close to the border .... ). See also Dmitry Zaks, NA TO Reports New Russian
Troop Buildup Along the Ukrainian Border, WASH. PosT (June 19, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/kiev-nato-allege-new-russian-troop-
buildup-just-across-the-ukrainian-border/2014/06/19/5002b I 96-f7c9-l1 le3-a3a5-
42be35962a52_story.htmIl.
I II See Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Vilnius, 28-29
November 2013, supra note 91.
112 Information on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, EUROPEAN UNION
http://eeas.europa.eu/top stories/2012/140912_ukraineen.htm (last visited Feb. 24,
2014).
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Ukraine exported around 25% of its goods to the EU;" however,
this percentage would most likely increase if Ukraine were to
integrate with the EU and enter into the DCFTA. Ukraine also
imports around 31% of its goods from the EU,"14 so entering into a
free trade agreement with the EU will hopefully reduce prices and
increase trade in both directions.
The Association Agreement also has the potential to greatly
impact Ukraine's institutions. For instance,
[t]he key parts focus on support to core reforms, economic
recovery and growth, and governance and sector cooperation in
areas such as energy, transport and environment protection,
industrial cooperation, social development and protection, equal
rights, consumer protection, education, youth, and cultural
cooperation. The Agreement also puts a strong emphasis on
values and principles: democracy and the rule of law, respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance, a
market economy, and sustainable development." 5
To obtain an idea of what sort of reforms the Association
Agreement could possibly bring to the Ukraine, one can look to
the Copenhagen criteria." 6 Government transparency and fair
elections, for example, are some of the many positive reforms that
could come out of an association agreement.' 17
Closer integration with the EU could also make it easier for
Ukraine to access bailout funds from the IMF in the future. In the
past, the IMF "twice offered Ukraine loan packages, but each time
it stopped issuing the money after Ukraine refused to fulfill policy
requirements.""' As stated above, however, closer integration
113 In 2012, 24.9% of Ukrainian exports went to the EU, while 25.6% went to
Russia. European Union, Trade in Goods with Ukraine, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 9
(2014), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/i 13459.htm.
114 Id.
115 Information on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, supra note 112.
116 See supra Part I.A.2.
117 In 2004, the Ukrainian people took to the street to protest an election that was
viewed as fraudulent. See Joerg Forbrig, Why Ukraine's future lies with the EU, not
Russia, CNN (Dec. 13, 2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/03/opinion/ukraine-
protests-russia-forbrig/index.html?iid=articlesidebar. In addition, corruption and lavish
spending by Ukraine's President have come to light now that protestors have taken
control of the Kiev. See Katherine Jacobsen, Behind the decadence of a Ukrainian
president, ALJAZEERA (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth
/features/2014/02/behind-decadence-ukrainian-president-2014223205052722749.html.
118 Russia: Ukraine Should Seek Bailout Loan From IMF, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb.
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with the EU would bring with it reforms that could make it easier
for Ukraine to satisfy the IMF requirements. Furthermore, it is
already apparent that Russia will be less willing to extend a
helping hand financially if Ukraine chooses to go with the EU;
therefore, IMF support will be even more crucial in the future."'
2. Integrating with the CU
If Ukraine integrated with the CU, some of the first possible
benefits would be cheaper gas prices and debt relief from Russia.
Because Ukraine was awarded a $15 billion bailout in return for
backing away from the EU,'20 it is conceivable that similar
incentives may be available to Ukraine if it were to pursue
integration with the CU. In terms of gas prices, Russia has offered
to sell gas to Belarus at the same price as Russian consumers by
2014, because of "an integration discount."21 Considering
Ukraine's history of gas disputes with Russia, "an integration
discount" could be very enticing.
As far as foreign trade is concerned, joining the CU would
have a variety of different outcomes, both positive and negative.
As with any customs union, some of the benefits would include
the abolishment of customs duties between member states, which
brings with it cheaper goods and raw materials; increased direct
investment among member states; and free movement of
workers.122 Some of the disadvantages of integration with the CU
include member states losing the ability to negotiate trade
agreements with third party nations on their own; "member states
[having to apply] higher customs tariffs on the products they buy
from third countries; . . . [and the fact that] common customs
tariffs . . . will largely comply with Russia's customs tariffs",
which will result in higher prices for goods in member states, but
22, 2014), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/russia-ukraine-should-seek-bailout-loan-imf
119 See id.
120 See id.
121 This integration discount could save Belarus around $2 billion, because Belarus
"will pay $164 for 1,000 cubic meters of Russian gas in the first quarter of 2012
compared to an average gas price for Europeans of $400." Russia to Offer Domestic Gas
Price to Belarus by 2014, RIA NOVOSTI (Nov. 13, 2013), http://en.ria.ru/
world/20111125/169032805.html.
122 See Emin Akhundzada, Eurasian Customs Union: Advantages and
Disadvantages, NEWS AZ (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.news.az/articles/economy/86037.
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not Russia.123 Currently, "Ukraine has relatively low trade tariffs,"
which means that if it were to join the CU it would have to raise its
tariffs, resulting in a potential decrease in imports from the EU.124
Some experts argue that this decrease in imported goods from the
EU could have adverse effects on Ukraine's modernization.12 5
Joining the CU also has governmental implications for
Ukraine. Currently the CU does not impose any requirements like
the Copenhagen criteria on its potential members.126  Therefore,
much of the corruption and crony politics that helped start the
protests in the first place would likely continue.
B. Why is Ukraine Important to Russia and the CU?
Some suggest that the raison d'etre for the entire Eurasian
integration project is to keep Ukraine aligned with the interests of
Russia.127 Out of the states that have been actively courted to join
the CU and eventually the Eurasian Union, Ukraine is the crown
jewel in Russia's eyes because it is "a huge market and the cradle
of Russian civilization."'2 8 As stated earlier, Ukraine had the
second largest economy in the former Soviet Union; as a result, it
is not hard to imagine an economic union made up of former
Soviet states needing to add that sort of economic strength.129
When Armenia finally joins the CU, it will likely be the first
state to do so. 3 0 While the first accession to the CU will be hailed
123 Id. ("According to [the] Trade Consultancy of the Turkish Embassy in Moscow,
for Russia, 82% of tariffs remained the same, 14% were decreased, and 4% increased.
For Belarus, 75% of tariffs remained the same, 7% were decreased, and 18% increased.
For Kazakhstan, 45% of tariffs remained the same, 10% were decreased, and 45%
increased.").
124 Dragneva & Wolczuk, supra note 82.
125 See id.
126 See supra Part I.B.2. The only real reforms that would need to take place relate
to customs tariffs. Id.
127 See Gulshan Dietl, Eurasian Union: Substance and the Subtext, I J. EURASIAN
AFF. 19, 22 (2013).
128 Heritage, supra note 66.
129 See supra Part II; see also Nate Schenkkan, Customs Disunion, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(May 12, 2014), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/138457 ("Ukraine would bring to
the group growing consumer market, its borders with southeastern Europe, and its
relatively developed manufacturing sector. Indeed, without Ukraine, the Eurasian merger
makes little economic sense.").
130 See Armenia signs Customs Union roadmap, Kyrgyzstan needs more talks, supra
note 55.
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as great achievement,' 3 ' the CU's future expansion does not appear
to be proceeding as smoothly.'32 For example, Kyrgyzstan, likely
the second state to join the CU, delayed signing its road map
because it "had been 'drafted without Kyrgyzstan's involvement'
and risked subjecting the country to 'social problems and
instability." 3 3 Some CIS states, like Georgia and Moldova, have
actively been courted to sign trade agreements with the EU as part
of the Eastern Partnership; however, it would be considered a
major victory for Russia and the CU if they were able to lure the
"key ingredient in the whole deal"-Ukraine-permanently away
from the EU. 3 4 If Ukraine were to agree to join the CU, it could
give legitimacy to the CU and potentially sway other CIS states
that are on the fence.
Russia also has a key interest in Ukraine because of Ukraine's
relationship with Russia's energy sector. Ukraine is an important
oil and natural gas transit country for Russia because of the large
amount of gas that Russia exports to Western Europe via the
Bratstvo (Brotherhood) and Soyuz pipelines, which transgress
Ukraine."' According to the Russian Finance Ministry, "oil and
gas revenues account for almost 50% of budget income in
Russia."' 36  Considering a majority of Russian gas flows through
Ukraine, this dependence on oil and gas revenues puts Russia, and
131 The fact that Armenia is seeking to join the Customs Union carries extra
significance because "Armenia had long negotiated a potential Association Agreement
with the EU, . . . but reversed course towards Russia in September [2013]." Id.
132 See Heritage, supra note 66 ("Kyrgyzstan and Armenia say they will join but
other former Soviet republics such as Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova, which are being
wooed by the EU, have reservations. So do Uzbekistan, a large market of 30 million,
Turkmenistan and Tajikistan."); see also Schenkkan, supra note 129.
133 See Armenia signs Customs Union roadmap, Kyrgyzstan needs more talks, supra
note 55 (emphasis in original) (quoting Almazbek Atambaev, the president of
Krygyzstan).
134 Chris Morris, Ukraine throws EU's 'Eastern Partnership'into doubt, BBC NEWS
(Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25039630 (arguing the whole
eastern partnership "essentially falls apart without Ukraine").
135 Russia uses pipelines partially located in Ukraine to ship gas to Austria, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Moldova,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Turkey. Ukraine: Country Analysis Note, U.S. ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (last updated Mar. 2013), http://www.eia.
gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=up.
136 Putin: Hydrocarbons can no longer drive economic growth in Russia, ITAR-
TASS (Feb. 12, 2014, 8:32 PM), http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/718901.
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with it the CU's economy, in a vulnerable position.'" It is
possible that some of that vulnerability could be alleviated if
Ukraine opted to become more integrated with Russia through the
CU.
Upon Russia's reemergence into the international sphere, the
CU needs to entice Ukraine to join in order to succeed. Aside
from the reputational and legitimacy-related gains the CU would,
achieve by having Ukraine join, the CU's market, population, and
economy would be larger too. If the CU were to succeed,
President Putin's goal of establishing a Eurasian Union, a
"'powerful, supra-national union' of sovereign states like the
European Union, uniting economies, legal systems, customs
services and military capabilities to form a bridge between Europe
and Asia and rival the EU, the US and China," could be closer to
becoming a reality.'
C. Next Steps for Russia and the CU
With Ukraine's potential membership in the CU in a
precarious position, Russia is at a crossroads. Among the choices
available to Russia are that it can choose to use soft power to try to
entice Ukraine back into its arms, it can use its hard power to force
Ukraine into the CU, it can allow Ukraine to associate with the EU
and move onto adding other members, or it can repair its
relationship with Ukraine and use it as a bridge between Europe
and Russia.
The most worrisome path for Ukraine, the West, and other
former Soviet states would be for Russia to use hard power to
realign Ukraine with the Russia and the CU. The first hard power
option for Russia is for it to use its military to invade Ukraine and
install a new regime that is more friendly to Russia. There is
already evidence that this is a real possibility because President
Putin has the permission of Russia's parliament to use military
force in Ukraine, and the Russian military is perceived to be
amassing near the border of Ukraine.'39 According to the West,
Russia's annexation of Crimea violated its agreement to "respect
137 See Dietl, supra note 127, at 22.
138 Jon Henley, A brief primer on Vladimir Putin's Eurasian dream,
SHORTCUTSBLOG, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com
/world/shortcuts/2014/feb/i 8/brief-primer-viadimir-putin-eurasian-union-trade.
139 See supra Part II.A.2.
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the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of
Ukraine" under the Budapest Memorandum, which Russia signed
in 1994.140 Taking this path could have disastrous effects on the
long-term success of the CU and the forthcoming EEU, because of
the international sanctions that would fall on Russia. 14 1 Currently,
the EU and the United States have implemented sanctions that
essentially result in "travel restrictions and asset freezes against
those responsible for violating the sovereignty of Ukraine." 4 2
These sanctions are narrowly tailored to individuals, but far-
reaching economic sanctions calling for the isolation of Russia
have been considered.'43 While some EU member states have
been reluctant to pursue harsh economic restrictions,14 4 this would
likely change if Russia were actually to invade eastern Ukraine.
Russia is a major trade partner of many EU states,145 and as such, it
140 Joshua Keating, So Much For the Budapest Memorandum, SLATE (Mar. 19,
2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the-world_/2014/03/19/the-budapest memorandum
in_1994 russia agreed to respect ukraine_s borders.html, (quoting Budapest
Memorandum on Security Assurances, 1994, Council On Foreign Relations (Dec. 5,
1994), available at http://www.cfr.org/arms-control-disarmament-and-nonproliferation/
budapest-memorandums-security-assurances- 199 4/p3 24 84 ); see also Crisis in Ukraine:
Kidnapped by the Kremlin, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 8, 2014), http://www.economist.com
/news/leaders/21598639-west-can-punish-putins-russia-its-belligerence-ukraine-only-if-
it-prepared?spc=scode&spv-xm&ah=9d7f7ab9455 10a56fa6d37c30b6fl709 (noting
Russia has argued that the memorandum "is no longer valid because the government in
Kiev has been overthrown").
141 See Schenkkan, supra note 129. ("The diminishing commitment of former Soviet
Union countries to regional integration is a little noticed but critical side effect of
Western sanctions on Russia. Russia remains the economic linchpin of the region, and
costs imposed on the country are trickling down to Belarus, Kazakhstan, and beyond.").
142 Martin Santa & Luke Baker, Exclusive: EU approves framework for asset
freezes, travel bans on Russia, REUTERS (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article
/2014/03/12/us-ukraine-eu-russia-sanctions-idUSBREA2BOQJ20140312; see also
Bradley Klapper, Senate Panel Advances Tough Sanctions on Russia, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Mar. 12, 2014), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/senate-bill-proposes-tough-sanctions-
russia.
143 See Mark Landler, Annie Lowrey & Steven Lee Myers, Obama Steps Up Russia
Sanctions in Ukraine Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014
/03/21/us/politics/us-expanding-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine.html.
144 See Colum Lynch, U.S. Increasingly Isolated on Russia Sanctions, THE CABLE,
FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 3, 2014, 8:13 PM), http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/
2014/03/03/germany_and us_diverge over russia sanctions.
145 See Santa & Baker supra note 142 ("The EU has foreign direct investment worth
approximately 170 billion euros in Russia and close trade ties: the total value of trade
was 335 billion euros in 2012.").
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would suffer severely if economic sanctions were imposed.
Because Russia's economy makes up a majority of the CU's
economic output,'4 6 there would be a real risk of collapse of the
CU's economy if Russia were to be sanctioned and harmed
economically. As a result of the potential for Russian isolation
and economic strife, potential member states would be less likely
to join the CU and instead choose to associate with the EU.
Another realistic option could be for Russia to wait and
encourage Ukraine to split in two."7 As stated above, Ukraine is
generally ethnically divided along an east-west axis.'4 8 In Ukraine,
"[m]ost of the support for closer ties to Moscow . . . is in the
Russian-speaking [e]ast" and south.'4 9 Some have argued that
Ukraine should go the way of Czechoslovakia and allow the state
to be split based off a lawful referendum.'s If that were to occur,
the western half of Ukraine might be able to pursue integration
with the EU and the eastern half of Ukraine could either pursue
integration with the CU as an independent state or be absorbed by
Russia. This could set a bold precedent when it comes to former
Soviet states that have areas with Russian ethnic groups,'s' and
could lead to the break-up of states along ethnic lines. It is
146 See supra Part I.B.2.
147 While Russia has not officially invaded eastern Ukraine, Russia has been
accused of actively working to destabilize eastern Ukraine by supporting the separatists
in the region. See War by Any Other Name, THE ECONOMIST (July 5, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21606290-russia-has-effect-already-invaded-
eastern-ukraine-question-how-west-will.
148 See supra Part II.A
149 Joshua Keating, Divorce, Ukrainian-Style, SLATE (Feb. 24, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the-world/2014/02/27/divorce ukrainianstyle would ukr
ainebe betteroff splitting.html.
150 See id. On March 16, 2014, the Crimean region of Ukraine held a referendum to
secede from Ukraine, which resulted in 95.5% of voters in Crimea opting to join Russia.
See Crimea referendum: Voters 'back Russia union', BBC NEWS (Mar. 16, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26606097; see also Group of 7: Crimea
Referendum a 'Deeply Flawed Process Which Would Have No Moral Force', SPEED
READS, THE WEEK (Mar. 12), http://theweek.com/article/index/257856/speedreads-
group-of-7-crimea-referendum-a-deeply-flawed-process-which-would-have-no-moral-
force (indicating "[t]he Group of 7 . . . won't recognize the outcome of a referendum").
151 Transnistria in Moldova and Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia are
examples of such regions within former Soviet states. See Oleksandr V. Turchynov,
Kiev's Message to Moscow, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes
.com/2014/03/12/opinion/ukraines-president-rebuffs-russian-
imperialism.html?ref=opinion& r-0.
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possible that the fear of losing territory either to independence or
to Russia could affect a potential member state's decision on
which integration path to take.
Another hard power option that Russia has actively pursued is
to further cripple the Ukrainian economy by shutting off Ukraine's
supply of Russian gas. 15 2 On June 16, 2014, Gazprom, a Russian
energy company, cut off natural gas supplies to Ukraine because
Ukraine missed a Russia-imposed deadline "to pay a nearly $2
billion installment for past gas deliveries."" As a result of the gas
shut off, it is not inconceivable that there could be a new wave of
protests that could usher in a leader that is more likely to appease
Russia and join the CU in exchange for financing and debt
forgiveness.'5 4 This sort of economic bullying could have
implications for other states that are on the fence when it comes to
joining the CU. 5s
IV. Conclusion
For Russia to achieve its goal of a strong and integrated region,
it needs Ukraine and other CIS states to join its customs union. If
the CU is to be the solid foundation of a Eurasian Union, it must
integrate most of the CIS states not already integrated with the EU
and become a larger and more diversified union. In light of the
current events in Ukraine, however, it appears that Russia is going
to have a difficult task attracting the members it needs. One can
only hope that Russia will begin to rely on soft power rather than
hard power to achieve its goals.
152 See Neil MacFarquhar, Gazprom Cuts Russia's Natural Gas Supply to Ukraine,
N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/world/europe/russia-
gazprom-increases-pressure-on-ukraine-in-gas-dispute.html.
153 Id.
154 It should also be noted that the tactic could also backfire and cause the people of
the Ukraine to sway even more to the West because it would further worsen Ukrainian
people's views of Russia.
155 For example, Turkmenistan, a potential CU member and a leading gas exporter
in the Caspian and Central Asian region, sends majority of its gas to Russia where it is
consumed or transits through Russia to end markets in Europe. Turkmenistan Energy
Data and Analysis, Energy Information Agency 5 (2012), available at
www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/cabs/Turkmenistan/pdfpdf. Conceivably, Russia
could raise transport costs for Turkmen gas along Russia pipelines in a coercive effort to
force Turkmenistan into the CU. That said, Russia could also offer Turkmenistan lower
transport fees to entice it to join.
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Ukraine and many other CIS states are facing the same
dilemma Ulysses and his crew faced while attempting to decide
which path to take. Although both options have their costs and
benefits, it is important to consider the long-term ramifications of
either deal. Each state faces a tough decision. However, the
danger is not over after the choice is made, as Ulysses lost his
entire crew after they survived the trials of Scylla and
Charybdis. '6
156 See HOMER, supra note 1.
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